Beyond Abolition: Reimagining India’s Digital Tax Regime in the Post-Equalisation Levy Era

The author is Manav Pamnani, a Fourth Year Student from NALSAR University of Law, Hyderabad.

Abstract:

This paper critically examines India’s recent decision to abolish the Equalisation Levy (EL), a unilateral tax on digital services, and situates it within the evolving global discourse on cross-border digital taxation. Initially introduced in 2016 and later expanded in 2020 to cover e-commerce supplies, the very objective of the EL was to address the challenge of value creation without physical presence. Its recent abolition raises questions on the efficacy of the decision, considering the estimated annual revenue shortfall of over three thousand crore, while also accounting for its benefits such as tax certainty, simplification, and alignment with international practices, an inquiry which this article seeks to conduct. It proceeds by evaluating the three principle rationales behind this abolition, these being legal simplification and tax certainty, accommodation towards international pressure and pragmatism, and India’s alignment with multilateral instruments. The paper further situates India’s exit from EL within a comparative context, contrasting it with the prevalence of Digital Service Taxes (DSTs) among European countries. While the abolition signals India’s commitment to multilateralism and enhances its image as an investor-friendly jurisdiction, the paper argues that the decision also entails risks including fiscal loss without a guaranteed substitute, weakened bargaining power in multilateral negotiations, and potential inequities between global corporations and domestic firms. To reconcile these tensions, the paper conceptualises a model which will potentially serve as a middle-ground solution, operating as a judicial checklist or laying down effective legislative guiding principles. This article finally concludes by arguing that adopting the proposed model instead of blanket abolition is a better approach which would balance revenue needs, tax certainty, and international cooperation concerns, offering a useful reference point for developing economies like India that are currently navigating digital taxation.

Keywords: Abolition, Digital Services, Equalisation Levy, Model, Tax

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Introduction and Background

The Indian Government on March 24, 2025, put forward a proposal to abolish the currently existing six percent EL on online advertisements (colloquially known as “google tax”).^[1] This suggestion was a part of the comprehensive set of fifty-nine amendments to the Finance Bill, introduced in the Lok Sabha.^[2] As explained in the Income Tax Officer v. Right Florists case, an EL is a direct tax which is withheld by the service recipient at the time of payment to a non-resident service provider.^[3] Within the Indian legal framework, there are two types of EL, both of which stand abolished after the current Amendment.^[4] These two categories include the two percent EL on e-commerce transactions which was abolished on August 1, 2024,^[5] and the six percent EL on online advertisements, the abolition of which is effective from April 1, 2025.^[6] EL was initially introduced by the 2016 Finance Act (Chapter VIII) to cover the entire ambit of online advertisement, including any digital advertising space or any related advertising service or activity.^[7] However, through the 2020 Finance Act, this had been extended to cover e-commerce supplies.^[8] The rationale was to account for cross-border online transactions in today’s increasingly digitalised twenty-first century world to generate revenue by preventing such transactions from remaining untaxed.^[9] This aligned India’s framework with the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting plan which aimed to prevent tax avoidance by taxing corporations where economic activity occurred.^[10] Further, the imposition of EL was a pioneering attempt to address the value creation without physical presence problem in digital taxation.[11] To avoid double taxation for the same transaction, the scheme was meticulously designed with the taxable amount under EL being exempt from regular income tax under Section 10(50) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (IT Act).^[12]

The abolition of EL as a whole today raises questions pertaining to its efficacy, particularly considering an annual loss in fiscal revenue of approximately three-thousand crore rupees.^[13] This has to be balanced with the reasoning behind such an abolition which is primarily to foster legal simplification and tax certainty, accommodate and counter international pressure from countries such as the United States (US) which had threatened to implement reciprocal trade tariffs in response to EL which they termed “discriminatory”, and align India’s position with multilateral instruments.^[14] 

In this backdrop, the article seeks to explore the effectiveness of this move, keeping in mind the lost revenue but a simultaneously accommodative stance to one of the largest economies in the world,^[15] alongside other relevant factors such as a simplification of the Indian tax regime. It further aims to evaluate its practical implications, arguing that although a well-calculated decision, a developing country like India would benefit not from a complete abolition but from a middle-ground approach, which would effectively counter international pressure while furthering the domestic policy objectives through revenue-generation. The paper proceeds by first examining the rationales of this abolition, before discussing the practical implications and finally delineating the way forward.

Evaluation of the Rationales behind this Abolition

The rationales mentioned above^[16] reflect India’s overarching objective to position itself as an international investment-friendly jurisdiction and a responsible stakeholder in global tax diplomacy. Firstly, the abolition seeks to promote tax certainty and the simplification of the existing taxation regime. Secondly, it represents an accommodative and pragmatic response to sustained international pressure, particularly from major trading partners. Thirdly, the abolition aligns India’s digital taxation framework with the emerging global multilateral instruments.

1. Tax certainty and simplification of the taxation regime

   
   

A.  Overlapping Digital Tax Levies and the Risk of Double Taxation under India’s Indirect and Direct Tax Framework

The existence of EL had resulted in significant overlaps with existing provisions under the Goods and Services Tax (GST) regime, withholding tax obligations under the IT Act, corporate income tax, and transfer pricing rules in related-party transactions.^[17] In practice, businesses often struggled to determine which tax applied in which scenario, and despite the presence of Section 10(50), they were often subject to multiple levies on the same transaction.^[18] A digital platform providing subscription-based services could simultaneously fall within the purview of GST, be subject to transfer pricing scrutiny, and still attract EL obligations. For example, GST law provides for the category of Online Information Database Access and Retrieval (OIDAR) services, which include mainly automated services facilitated by information technology through an electronic network or the internet. An illustrative list of OIDAR services includes cloud services, digital data storage, online gaming, and internet advertising.^[19] Therefore, when a non-resident service provider engages in providing these services, there is an overlap with EL since the EL also includes similar services. This gave rise to potential double taxation, especially considering that being separate and independent levies, EL and GST could not be credited against the other.^[20]These outcomes not only increased compliance costs but also generated litigation risks, which in turn, undermined India’s objective of fostering a transparent and investor-friendly tax regime.

B. Ambiguity in Scope and Compliance Burdens: Uncertainty as a Structural Flaw of the Equalisation Levy

One of the most persistent problems of EL was the lack of clarity regarding its scope. There was no clear statutory definition of “online advertisement” or “e-commerce supply or services” which led to ambiguity with businesses speculating whether a particular transaction fell within its ambit. Assigning the ordinary commercial understanding to these phrases was insufficient because the interpretative inconsistencies continued. For example, it was unclear if the purchase of cloud storage services by an Indian company or the subscription fees paid to global streaming platforms in situations where advertisements were merely incidental to the service or even a digital marketing analytics tool with embedded advertisements, fell within the scope of EL.

Such uncertainty also created the fear of retrospective scrutiny because of the possibility of tax authorities subsequently claiming that a particular service rendered much earlier was covered under EL and hence taxable, along with interests and requisite penalties. These ambiguities risked creating distortions in business behaviour, resulting in companies either over-complying to avoid penalties or restructuring contracts in inefficient ways to bypass exposure to EL.

It also made India a less attractive destination for digital service providers, especially smaller enterprises, which found it very difficult to navigate complex tax planning. The structure and framework of EL placed withholding responsibility on Indian service recipients rather than their foreign counterparts^[21] which resulted in micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs) with limited legal and tax expertise being saddled with the responsibility of interpreting cross-border digital arrangements and ensuring compliance. Since defaults could lead to hefty penalties, this mechanism discouraged the uptake of global digital services which had the potential of enhancing productivity and development, due to the disproportionate compliance costs in relation to the value of the transaction.

A potential counter to the certainty justification could be a legislative clarification or clear Amendment rather than a complete removal but the ambiguities were so nuanced that there were bound to be internal disagreements without adequate deliberation. Further, the additional reasons discussed in the subsequent section  indicate that even a clear clarification was insufficient to account for the broader problems that such a levy posed at a macroeconomic level.

II. Accommodation towards international pressure and pragmatism 

A. Foreign Investment Disincentives and Macroeconomic Costs: Why the Equalisation Levy Undermined India’s Growth Strategy

The EL on online advertisements significantly affected global technology giants like Google and Meta and served as a potential disincentive for them to expand operations in the Indian market.^[22] This would ultimately result in pulling back of foreign presence and investment in India due to the duplicative and administratively complicated framework with low tax certainty and barriers to the ease of doing business initiative formally introduced in India in 2014.^[23] Since a developing country like India largely depends on foreign investment to meet its policy objectives like generating employment and improving digital infrastructure, the Indian government has rightly abolished EL.

A potential counter to this argument can be that due to the massive revenue loss, India’s objectives are being hindered rather than catalysed. However, this contention fails to consider that an impetus to foreign direct investment has led to a five-yearly average inflow of around seventy billion US dollars with the total inflow in the financial year 2024-25 being around eighty-one billion US Dollars (a fourteen percent increase from the previous financial year), accompanied with the creation of lakhs of jobs and other employment opportunities.^[24]

Further, investment flexibilities and a favourable tax regime will advance India’s objective of becoming the third largest economy in the world by 2030 with a gross domestic product of 7.3 trillion US dollars.^[25] The continuance of EL could lead to global giants withdrawing their investments which will have a detrimental effect on India’s positive economic projections. Therefore, this abolition, although temporarily reduces revenue-generation, is a pragmatic, futuristic measure which will potentially offset the revenue loss multiple times, ultimately leading to positive outcomes.

B. Geopolitical and Trade Policy Constraints: The Limits of Abolishing the Equalisation Levy in an Uncertain Global Order:

A caveat to the argument above isthat although a reasonable projection would indicate increased revenue inflows as a result of this abolition, the dynamic international landscape and constantly changing legal frameworks across the globe could potentially hamper this prediction. For example, since companies like Google strive towards profit-making, they will increase their market share in those countries favourable for their growth. So, in spite of the abolition of EL in India, the possibility of them transferring their services to other countries with more favourable markets, including higher tax benefits, less competition, and greater subsidies cannot be completely ruled out.

India’s political relations with nations such as the US also to a great extent determine the market presence of these global technology giants. The epitome of this is the ban on TikTok and fifty-eight other Chinese apps during the Covid-19 pandemic, due to strained relations between India and China.^[26] Further, the imposition of EL resulted in deteriorating trade relations between India and the US. The US Trade Representative published a Section 301 Report wherein India’s levy was characterised as discriminatory against American technology companies which dominate the global digital marketplace.^[27] This was because EL applied to foreign digital service providers while exempting Indian firms. This led to threats of retaliatory tariffs on Indian exports with serious economic repercussions, considering the scale of the Indo-US trade. A twenty-five percent tariff was proposed, which was suspended only after the conclusion of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and Group of 20 (G20) multilateral negotiations and a bilateral compromise between India and the US.^[28] This ultimately led to the abolition of EL in 2024 and 2025.

Therefore, by strategically abolishing this levy, India has demonstrated a pragmatic approach by striking a balancing act between sovereign taxing rights and global cooperation through the preservation of trade relations. However, the imposition of disproportionate US tariffs on India today, for other political and strategic reasons, question the veracity of this rationale for the abolition of the EL.^[29] This is because ultimately an outcome that was intended to be avoided has through other mechanisms entered India’s global economic and political landscape.

III. India’s alignment with multilateral instruments: The abolition of EL by India has to be situated within the context of ongoing OECD/G20 tax reform efforts. India is an active participant in the inclusive OECD framework which produced the two-pillar solution designed to address tax challenges arising from digitalisation.^[30]

The first pillar seeks to reallocate taxing rights over a portion of residual profits of the largest and most profitable multinational enterprises to market jurisdictions by expanding a country’s authority to tax profits of these large companies which don’t have a physical presence in the host nation. Pillar two further introduces a global minimum corporate tax of fifteen percent to curb base erosion and profit shifting and reduce tax avoidance practices.^[31] The first pillar indicates that India would gain taxing rights over these global giants even without the imposition of EL.

However, a reservation expressed by India was that the thresholds for the applicability of pillar one were extremely high, being at least twenty billion euros and net profits of over ten percent, which would result in the exclusion of most digital businesses except few with an extremely large global presence.^[32] Therefore, continuing to impose EL would effectively counter this particular consequence.

Although the OECD tax reforms have not come into force,^[33] the imposition of EL created the risk of double taxation wherein India would get simultaneous rights to global profits under pillar one, alongside taxing the same revenues under EL. To avoid this, India had initially termed EL as an “interim” or “temporary” measure which would operate until pillar one came into force.^[34] However, US and other OECD members moved for its abolition for the very reason of avoiding the simultaneous operation problem.^[35] Therefore, the abolition of EL today aligns India’s framework with OECD’s two-pillar solution, a crucial multilateral instrument, thus bringing India’s position in line with international best practices.

Exploring the Interrelationship between EL and DSTs

DSTs are taxes imposed on the revenues (not profits) of large multinational digital companies, operating in digital marketplaces without the physical presence requirement.^[36] They generally apply to services where users play a central role in value creation such as online advertising and the sale of user data.^[37] They operate on a rationale similar to the EL because both aim to account for taxation in the digital economy which traditional corporate tax rules fail to capture.^[38] DSTs are prevalent in European countries such as France (three percent), Italy (three percent), and the United Kingdom (two percent).^[39] Although often equated with EL,^[40] DSTs should be interpreted as being comparatively broader because they encompass turnover across multiple digital services, unlike the EL which is more narrowly defined to cover specific instances of e-commerce supply or services and online advertising. Similar to the EL, DSTs have not been perceived positively by the global community. The US has threatened retaliatory tariffs on European exports which has sparked trade tensions.^[41] Further, there have been debates about whether DSTs violate principles of non-discrimination under the World Trade Organisation’s (WTO) legal framework.^[42] Large multinational enterprises have also argued that the imposition of DSTs has resulted in onerous compliance burdens and complexity which discourages investment.^[43] Therefore, on a consequential level, DSTs rank at par with EL. However, by strategically exiting from EL, India has adopted a novel and pragmatic approach, in contrast to Europe which has retained DSTs despite the widespread pushback. This indicates that India aims to posit itself as a forward-looking, investment-friendly jurisdiction by avoiding trade conflicts and prioritising tax certainty.

Practical Implications of the Abolition: A Double-Edged Sword?

(i) Positive Implications

The above analysis posits a positive picture by predicting that this abolition will result in greater tax certainty, simplification of the Indian tax regime, and short-term losses but potential long-term benefits through increased global corporate investment inflows, particularly if OECD allocations are effective.

This abolition will lead to reliefs in compliance burdens and costs, although the imposition of GST and Tax Deducted at Source (TDS) provisions will continue to operate. Additionally, if the relevant corporate entities adopt a pass-through approach wherein consumers may be passed on the benefits of reduced tax burden, the market prices of digital services will decrease, driving up demand and further stimulating the economy. It also improves India’s reputation in the global sphere, indicating India’s reliability in multilateral forums, boosting its case for leadership in global digital governance, and signalling its objective towards becoming a largely investment- friendly jurisdiction.

The abolition of EL on e-commerce supplies in 2024 supports the current implication claims because even that move was widely praised by companies including Amazon, Google, and Flipkart and although it resulted in a large annual revenue shortfall, the increased digital presence and GST receipts offset the losses.^[44] It also resulted in a resolution of several pending EL disputes.^[45]

(ii) Potential Downsides

The implications of the abolition do not entirely present a positive picture. Firstly, being a developing country with high fiscal deficits, constrained resources, and mounting expenditure commitments on welfare and infrastructure,^[46] giving up the large quantum of revenue without an assured alternative may not be a prudent approach.Secondly, , EL served as India’s bargaining chip in global negotiations,^[47] which might be weakened after its abolition. An over-reliance on the OECD Framework might also not lead to intended outcomes because the implementation of pillar one which was originally expected by 2023 has been delayed due to political disagreements, particularly from the US Congress.^[48] If multilateral consensus and corresponding reform stalls, India risks having dismantled a functioning unilateral mechanism without any substitute, creating a fiscal gap.Thirdly, , since the abolition of EL benefits only global corporations, domestic digital firms and small and medium enterprises that bore compliance burdens and competed against these giants see little benefit. This potentially raises concerns of policy capture wherein international pressure leads to measures favouring powerful multinationals over India’s domestic interests. It also indicates policy instability because the frequent introduction, expansion and abolition shows volatility, which undermines investor confidence as much as retaining ambiguous levies would have.

Furthermore, the introduction of EL was originally justified on grounds of fairness to prevent foreign digital companies earning huge revenues from Indian users being exempt from taxation.^[49] Its abolition revives the perception of inequitable taxation wherein domestic players remain fully taxed whereas global giants enjoy preferential treatment. Lastly, although it has been argued that the abolition has administratively simplified the system, it risks India under-taxing cross-border digital transactions. This is because the dependence solely on GST and corporate income tax as the main digital taxation tools is insufficient due to GST capturing only consumption and corporate income tax being based on profit attribution rules which remain outdated and highly contestable in the digital economy. ^[50]

Conceptualising a Way Forward

This section is divided into two broad parts. Part (i) explains the foundational premise of the conceptualised framework and how it would operate in practice. On the other hand, Part (ii) lays out the fundamental guiding principles that should be followed. These include: (1) A sunset clause linked to the operationalisation of Pillar One; (2) A revenue threshold restricting the levy to large multinational enterprises; (3) A credit mechanism to prevent double taxation; (4) A unified compliance portal to reduce procedural complexity; and (5) A domestic ring-fencing approach to ensure visible public utilisation of the revenue generated.

(i) Background and Operational Intricacies of the Introduced Model

Upon considering both sides of these implications, this paper recommends a middle-ground approach, balancing sovereignty with multilateralism. This has been termed as the Hybrid Digital Taxation Model (HDTM) because it blends unilateral and multilateral elements. On one hand, it retains a limited domestic taxing right through a narrowly scoped EL–type instrument to safeguard India’s fiscal interests in the interim. On the other, it is structurally tethered to the OECD Pillar One framework through sunset clauses and crediting mechanisms, ensuring that unilateral action does not operate independently or permanently. Additionally, it adopts a centred, hybrid approach by not abolishing EL as a whole and retaining its benefits, while introducing certain conditions and threshold requirements.

The HDTM can serve both as a judicial checklist and a set of legislative guiding principles. The advantages of this model include the maintenance of fiscal sovereignty, preservation of revenue, introduction of clarity, and substantial alignment with OECD norms. In practice, the HDTM would operate through a sequential and conditional mechanism rather than as a parallel levy.

At the first stage, digital transactions involving non-resident service providers would continue to be governed by GST and existing withholding provisions with the EL being applicable only upon the threshold conditions being met. Once triggered, the levy would be imposed at a standardised rate through a centralised compliance portal, with determination of liability driven by quantitative metrics such as user base, revenue attributable to India, or digital engagement indicators. This would limit discretionary assessments and foster predictability and consistency. The levy would function as a provisional collection mechanism and amounts paid would be tracked and escrowed for future adjustment against India’s eventual Pillar One profit allocations, rather than treated as a final tax cost. Upon the operationalisation of Pillar One, automatic crediting or refund mechanisms would be initiated, and the EL would lapse without further legislative intervention. This does not imply that the assessments would be retrospectively reassessed but aims to reduce the tax burden and potential double taxation particularly during the transitional period.

Although sound in theory, the implementation of this model might be difficult in practice due to the possibility of legal challenges under WTO norms and bilateral investment treaties, scope for US retaliation, resultant administrative complexity, and the requirement of treaty-level negotiations to operationalise the various provisions. The paper recognises this caveat but argues that India should strive towards adopting the HDTM to aim to bring about better consequences, rather than a blanket abolition of EL.

(ii) Core Principles of the Model: 

Principle 1: Sunset Clause

India’s unilateral levy in the form of EL should operate temporarily and automatically lapse once pillar one of the OECD is fully operational, preventing indefinite double taxation. Current negotiations reveal that members are not considering implementing a grandfathering provision under which existing unilateral levies will continue for a stipulated number of years, except a brief mention of the same in paragraph 124 of the Draft Revised Manual for the Negotiation of Bilateral Tax Treaties between Developed and Developing Countries.^[51] Contrary to this, the OECD statement released on October 8, 2021, which reflected the agreement reached by one hundred and thirty-six members, clearly provided that once the OECD framework comes into effect, the existing DSTs and other unilateral levies will have to be rolled back. ^[52] Therefore, the sunset clause provision is in accordance with developments on existing negotiations.

Principle 2: Revenue Threshold applicable to EL

EL should apply only to multinational enterprises with a global turnover of above seven hundred and fifty million euros and not startups or MSMEs. The monetary threshold has been adopted from the GloBE Model Rules under pillar two of the OECD framework which imposes an effective tax rate (ETR) of fifteen percent for entities exceeding this turnover requirement.^[53] This would ensure encompassing the largest corporations which were the real target behind the introduction of EL, thus securing adequate revenue generation to meet developmental needs, while not burdening small corporations from excessive compliance burdens or tax levies.

Principle 3: Credit Mechanism

The actual tax paid under EL can be credited against pillar one allocations, ensuring no double taxation burden.

Principle 4: Unified Compliance Portal

The introduction of a single digital portal for EL and corporate tax filings to reduce compliance friction and make procedural filings easier.

Principle 5: Domestic Ring-Fencing

The Government should channel the revenues resulting from the imposition of EL towards digital infrastructure and skill development, particularly in those areas clearly demonstrating visible public benefit. This provision does not amount to reducing EL to a cess wherein funds are earmarked for a particular purpose.^[54] It is more like a good faith provision keeping public interest in mind. Although the very concept of taxation avoids any form of quid pro quo,^[55] the utilisation of taxation revenues towards meeting the needs of people would ultimately improve standards of living and lead to overall development.

Conclusion

The abolition of India’s EL is both a surrender and a strategy. It concedes the right of unilateral taxation but strengthens India’s credibility in OECD negotiations, making it an investor-friendly jurisdiction. However, in spite of its benefits, it creates a revenue vacuum, exposing India to uncertainty about the OECD’s eventual effectiveness. The way forward therefore lies not in the extreme positions adopted but in crafting a hybrid approach that amalgamates the benefits of both regimes. Introducing the HDTM marks a strategic recalibration in the global tax set-up which is unprecedented since countries across the globe, particularly European nations, excessively emphasise on DSTs. The model therefore sets a template especially for developing countries which need to balance their policy objectives with the levy of taxes such as the EL. It is therefore hoped that India adopts the hybrid approach rather than a complete abolition, particularly with ongoing uncertainty surrounding OECD negotiations. With countries such as France and UK recently conducting DST revisions and Canada withdrawing the DST as a whole, alongside other countries such as Australia, Poland, and Belgium, and international bodies such as the United Nations (Article 12AA of the Model Double Taxation Convention allows the source state to tax fees paid for cross-border services to a resident of another country on a gross basis)^[56] introducing DSTs,^[57]the global position today remains blurred. Adopting the hybrid model would resolve these inconsistencies and reasonably strengthen the current global tax regime.

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[32] ‘The Multilateral Convention to Implement Amount A of Pillar One’ (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). <https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/topics/policy-issues/cross-border-and-international-tax/multilateral-convention-to-implement-amount-a-of-pillar-one.pdf> accessed 01 September 2025.

[33] ‘Balancing on two pillars: Global corporate tax reform’ (European Parliament) <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2024/762346/EPRS_BRI(2024)762346_EN.pdf> accessed 02 September 2025 (‘European Parliament’).

[34] Ministry of Finance, ‘India and USA agree on a transitional approach on Equalisation Levy 2020’ (Press Information Bureau, 24 November 2021) <https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1774692> accessed 11 September 2025.

[35] Piyush Mohan (n 14).

[36] ‘What Is A Digital Services Tax That Can Increase Trump Tariffs’ (NDTV World, 26 August 2025) <https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/what-is-a-digital-services-tax-why-trump-wants-to-impose-tariffs-on-countries-with-it-9160213> accessed 28 August 2025 (‘NDTV World’).

[37] NDTV World (n 36).

[38] Kane Borders and Others, ‘Digital Service Taxes’ (EU Tax Observatory, June 2023) <https://www.taxobservatory.eu/www-site/uploads/2023/06/EUTO_Digital-Service-Taxes_June2023.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com> accessed 27 July 2025 (‘Kane Borders’)

[39] ‘Digital services tax in Europe’ (Grant Thorton, 25 February 2019) <https://www.grantthornton.global/en/insights/articles/digital-services-tax-in-europe/> accessed 30 July 2025

[40] Kane Borders (n 38)

[41] Céline Braumann and Danielle Du Maresq, ‘A Bite at the Apple: States’ Struggle to Tax Digital Services’ (Blog of the European Journal of International Law, 27 December 2023) <https://www.ejiltalk.org/a-bite-at-the-apple-states-struggle-to-tax-digital-services/#:~:text=When%2011%20states%20took%20similar%20steps%20towards,of%20the%20US%20Trade%20Act%20of%201974.> accessed 22 July 2025.

[42] Alice Pirlot and Henri Culot, ‘When International Trade Law Meets Tax Policy: The Example of Digital Services Taxes’ (Oxford University) <https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:647c9873-4b09-4f2f-906b-6680726a6051/files/rgx41mj28v> accessed 24 July 2025.

[43] Aruna Kalyanam and Chris Miller, ‘How taxation of digital services is again a concern for businesses’ (EY, 12 August 2025) <https://www.ey.com/en_gl/insights/tax/how-taxation-of-digital-services-is-again-a-concern-for-businesses#:~:text=The%20shift%20from%20coordinated%20tax,attempt%20to%20achieve%20compliance%20retrospectively.> accessed 09 September 2025.

[44] Gireesh Chandra Prasad, ‘India drops e-commerce levy that irked the US’ (Mint, 23 July 2024) <https://www.livemint.com/budget/ecommerce-union-budget-2024-tax-nirmala-sitharaman-financial-services-equalization-levy-tax-law-cloud-services-11721736776585.html> accessed 01 September 2025 (‘Gireesh Chandra Prasad’).

[45] Gireesh Chandra Prasad (n 44).

[46] PK Santosh Kumar, ‘India needs to keep its deficit target flexible’ (The New Indian Express, 11 March 2025) <https://www.newindianexpress.com/opinions/2025/Mar/10/india-needs-to-keep-its-deficit-target-flexible#:~:text=The%20Fiscal%20Responsibility%20and%20Budget,economic%20differences%20and%20financial%20constraints.> accessed 03 September 2025.

[47] Suranjali Tandon, ‘A tax that served India’s interests – no more’ (The Indian Express, 28 March 2025) <https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/a-tax-that-served-indias-interests-no-more-9909984/> accessed 03 September 2025.

[48] European Parliament (n 33).

[49] Shreya Rao, ‘The Indian Equalisation Levy: Inelegant but not Unexpected’ (2016) 2(1) NLSIR 25, 25-46.

[50] Jane Kelsey, ‘Reconciling Tax and Trade Rules in the Digitalised Economy: Challenges for ASEAN and East Asia’ (Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia, August 2021) <https://www.eria.org/uploads/media/discussion-papers/FY21/Reconciling-Tax-and-Trade-Rules-in-the-Digitalised-Economy_Challenges-for-ASEAN-and-East-Asia.pdf> accessed 29 August 2025.

[51] Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters, ‘Draft Revised Manual for the Negotiation of Bilateral Tax Treaties between Developed and Developing Countries’ (United Nations, 16-19 October 2018) <https://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/CRP11-Revision-of-the-Manual-on-the-Negotiation-of-Tax-Treaties-between-Developed-and-Developing-Countries.pdf> accessed 30 August 2025.

[52] ‘Statement on a Two-Pillar Solution to Address the Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalisation of the Economy’ (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 8 October 2021) <https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/topics/policy-issues/beps/statement-on-a-two-pillar-solution-to-address-the-tax-challenges-arising-from-the-digitalisation-of-the-economy-october-2021.pdf> accessed 10 September 2025.

[53] ‘Overview of the Key Operating Provisions of the GloBE Rules’ (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) <https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/topics/policy-sub-issues/global-minimum-tax/pillar-two-globe-rules-fact-sheets.pdf> accessed 22 August 2025.

[54] Shashank Sharma and Snehal Shukla, ‘Cess: An allowable expenditure under the Income-tax Act?’ (Lakshmikumaran Sridharan Attorneys, 16 June 2021) <https://www.lakshmisri.com/insights/articles/cess-an-allowable-expenditure-under-the-income-tax-act/#> accessed 5 September 2025.

[55] Vikramjit Reen, ‘A Review of McDowell Case in Light of Corporate Taxation under the New Economic Policy’ (1996) 8(1) NLSIR 138, 138-144.

[56] The United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention, art 12AA. 

[57] ‘State of play of Digital Services Taxes (DSTs) and other similar measures’ (Price Water Cooper, 29 August 2025) <https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/tax/newsletters/tax-policy-bulletin/assets/pwc-state-of-play-of-dsts-and-other-similar-measures.pdf#:~:text=In%202025%2C%20Belgium's%20new%20government%20pledged%20to,recently%20announced%20intentions%20to%20adopt%20new%20DSTs.> accessed 5 September 2025.